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[Crim. No. 9733.

v.

BUTLER

In Bank.

[64 C.2d

July 11, 1966.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDWARD M.
BUTLER et al., Defendants and Appellants.
[1] Criminal Law-Preliminary Proceedings-Objections: Evidence
-Obtained by Unlawful Seiznre: Searches and Seizures
-Bemedies.-Pen. Code, §§ 1539 and 1540, do not create an
exception to the rule that a motion raising the issue that
.evidence was illegally obtained is not required before objecting
at the trial to introduction of illegally obtained evidence j an
accused may attack the validity of a search warrant at the
preliminary hearing and at the trial regardless of whether he
attacked it under §§ 1539 and 1540. (Disapproving anything to
the contrary in People v. Keener, 55 Ca1.2d 714 [12 Cal.Rptr.
859, 361 P.2d 587] j People v. Marion, 197 Cal.App.2d 835 [18
Cal.Rptr. "219] j People v. Prieto, 191 Cal.App.2d 62 [12 Cal.
Rptr. 577]; People v. Dosier, 180 Cal.App.2d 436 [4 Cal.Rptr.
309]; People v. Lep'Ur, 175 Cal.App.2d 798 [346 P.2d 914];
People v. Nelson, 171 Cal.App.2d 356 [340 P.2d 718]; People v.
Phillips, 163 Cal.App.2d 541 [329 P.2d 621]; People v. Thornton, 161 Cal.App.2d 718 [327 P.2d 161]; .Arata v. Superior
Oourt,153 Cal.App.2d 767 [315 P.2d 473].)
[2] Searches ·a.nd Seizures-Remedies.-The Legislature's purpose
in enacting Pen. Code, §§ 1539 and 1540, was to afford the
person from whom property was wrongfully seized an expeditious remedy for its recovery, not to regulate the procedure for
objecting to introduction of evidence in criminal trials.
[3] Criminal Law - Preliminary Proceedings - Objections: Evidence-Obtained by Unlawful Seizure.-Defendant is allowed
to object for the first time at the preliminary hearing or at the
trial to introduction of evidence illegally obtained without a
warrant, and where the evidence was obtained under a search
warrant, there is no reason to adopt a different rule.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County granting probation following narcotics convictions.
John G. Barnes, Judge. Reversed.
Alton I. Leib for Defendants and Appellants.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 127; Am.Jur., Evidence (1st ed
§ 396).
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, §§ 168, 413.5(3);
Searches and Seizures, § 38; [2] Searches and Seizures, § 38; [3]
Criminal Law, §§ 168,413.5(1).
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Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James,
Assistant Attorney General, and William. L. Zessar, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and ;Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendants appeal from orders granting
them probation after they were convicted of possessing marijuana in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11530.
They contend that the trial court erred in not permitting them
to show that evidence introduced at their trial was obtained by
an illegal search and seizure.
On October 25, 1963, Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff
Charles Vaughn obtained a warrant to search defendants'
home and a,utomobile. It was issued on the basis of his affidavit
that he had information from a reliable confidential informer
of the use of narcotics at the described premises. The search
uncovered various items of evidence that led to defendants'
arrest and subsequent conviction~
At the preliminary hearing, defendants elicited testimony
from Deputy Sheriff Vaughn that on three or four occasions
he had crawled und.er their residence and looked through
cracks in the floor. He was then asked: "Q. Now, sir, you are
the one who made the application to Judge Farl~ for the
search warrant, is that correct T A. Yes, sir. Q. And you
made that application on the basis of the information you had
obtained while underneath the premises at 1788 Orange Grove
on those three or four previous occasions prior to January 25,
is that correct' MR. COURTNEY [Deputy District Attorney] :
Just a minute, Officer. I will object to the question. Apparently Counsel is trying to go behind the search warrant and
this is not the proper procedure for it. I will object to the
question on those grounds, Your Honor."
The committing magistrate sustained the objection on the
ground that defendants' failure to pursue the remedy provided by Penal Code sections 1539-1540 precluded them from
attacking the warrant. At the trial defendants made a motion
for a hearing to determine the facts underlying the issuance of
the warrant. The trial court denied the motion.
[1] In People v. Berger (1955) 44 Cal.2d 459, 464 [282
P .2d 509], we rejected the federal rule that ordinarily the
issue as to whether evidence was illegally obtained must be
raised by motion before trial and held that such a motion is
not required before an objection can be made at the trial to the
introduction of illegally obtained evidence. Several decisions
of the District Courts of Appeal, however, have held that the
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rule of the Berger case does not apply when a search and
seizure are made under a search warrant valid on its face and
that in such cases the defendant's remedy is to attack the
warrant uuder Penal Code sections 1539-1540. (People v. Marion (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 835, 838-839 [18 Cal.Rptr. 219];
People v. Prieto (1961) 191 Cal.App.2d 62, 66-67 [12 Cal.
Rptr. 577] ; People v. Dosier (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 436, 439440 [4 Cal.Rptr. 309] ; People v. Lepur (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d
798, 802 [346 P.2d 914] ; People v. Nelson (1959) 171 Cal.
App.2d 356, 360 [340 P.2d 718] ; People v. Phillips (1958) 163
Cal.App.2d 541, 545 [329 P.2d 621]; People v. Thornton
(1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 718, 721 [327 P.2d 161]; Arata v.
Superior Court (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 767, 770 [315 P.2d
473] .)
Penal Code sections 1539-15401 provide that if the grounds
for issuance .of the warrant are controverted, a hearing shall
be held, and if the magistrate finds that there is no probable
cause for believing the grounds on which the warrant was
issued, or if the property taken was uot that described in the
warrant, the magistrate must restore the property to the person from whom it was taken. In People v. Keener (1961) 55
Cal.2d 714, 719-720 [12 Cal.Rptr. 859, 361 P.2d 587], we held
that a magistrate's ruling sustaining a warrant in a proceeding under Penal Code sections 1539-1540 is not final and that
the defendant may thereafter renew his attack on the warrant
at the preliminary hearing and at the trial. Since the defendants in the Keener case had attacked the warrant under sections 1539 and 1540 before attacking it at the preliminary
hearing, it was unnecessary to decide whether a warrant valid
on its face must be attacked under those sections before an
objection can be made at the preliminary hearing or at the
trial to the introduction of evidence obtained under the warrant. We have concluded that sections 1539 and 1540 do not
create an exception to the rule of the Berger case and that a
rlefendant may therefore attack the validity of a warrant at
the preliminary hearing and at the trial whether or not he
lSection 1539 provides: "If the grounds on which the warrant was
issued be controverted, he must proceed to take testimony in relation
thereto, and the testimony of each witness must be reduced to writing
:nul authenticated in the manner prescribed in section eight hundred and
sixty-nine_ "
Section 1540 provides: "If it appears that the property taken is not
the same as that described in the warrant, or there is no probable cause
for believing the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was
issued, the magistrate must cause it to be restored to the pet"son from
whom it was taken."
.
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attacked it under sections 1539 and 1540. Anything to the
contrary in the foregoing decisions of the District Courts of
Appeal or in the Keener case is disapproved.
[2] Sections 1539 and 1540 were enacted in 1872, 83 years
before the exclusionary rule was adopted in People v. Cahan
(1955) 44 Ca1.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905, 50 A.L.R.2d 513]. Accordingly, the Legislature's purpose in enacting those sections was
not to regulate the procedure for objecting to the introduction
of evidence in criminal trials but to afford the person from
whom property was wrongfully seized an expeditious remedy
for its recovery. (See Aday v. Superior Court (1961) 55 Cal.
2d 789,800 [13 Cal.Rptr. 415,362 P.2d 47].)
Moreover, the remedy provided by sections 1539 and 1540
would serve the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule
fitfully at best. It would not preclude an officer from testifying
to what he saw in the course of a search under an invalid
warrant or from using information obtained in such a search
to secure other evidence. (See PeopZe v. Berger, supra, 44 Cal.
2d 459, 462; People v. Roberts (1956) 47 Ca1.2d 374, 378-379
[303 P.2d 721].) It would afford no relief to a defendant from
whom the property was not taken. (See People v. Martin
(1955) 45 Cal.2d 755, 759-761 [290 P.2d 855]; Jones v. United
States (1960) 362 U.S. 257, 260-267 [80 S.Ot. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d
697, 78 A.L.R.2d 233].) It would afford no relief when the
property is contraband, which cannot be returned. (See Aday
v. Superior Court, supra, 55 Cal.2d 789, 799-800.) Since the
state must afford to •• every defendant a full and fair opportunity to secure an adjudication of all claimed deprivations of
his constitutional rights in the securing of the evidence offered
against him at the trial" (In re Sterling (1965) 63 Ca1.2d
486,488 [47 Cal.Rptr. 205,407 P.2d 5]; see Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293, 312-318 [83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770]), a requirement that he must exhaust the remedy under sections 15391540 would entail either a broadening of the remedy beyond
the statutory terms or the adoption of exceptions when the
statutory remedy was inadequate.
Even if sections 1539 and 1540, enacted in 1872, were now
invoked to implement the 1955 exclusionary rule of the Cahan
case, difficult problems of timing would arise. Thus, if a defendant were excusably ignorant until the trial of facts to
controvert "the grounds on which the warrant was issued"
(Pen. Code, § 1539), it would be necessary either to postpone
. the trial until the validity of the warrant could be determined
by the magistrate who issued it or to waive the requirement
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that the warrant first be attacked before him. Since any decision the magistrate might reach would be subject to relitigation at the trial (People v. Keener, supra, 55 Cal2d 714, 719720), it would be pointless to delay the trial so that the validity of the warrant ~ould be litigated twice. Even if the defendant knew or should have known of grounds for attacking the
warrant at some time before trial, it would be a needless complication to require an adjudication of the time when he could
reasonably have been expected to proceed· before the magistrate and whether that time was so near the time set for tr-ial
that he should be excused from proceeding before the magistrate.
[3] The rule allowing the defendant to object for the first
time at the preliminary hearing or at the trial to the introduction of evidence illegally obtained without a warrant has
proved workable: We see no reason to adopt a dUferent rule
merely because evidence was obtained under a warrant. As we
pointed out in People v. Berger, supra, 44 Cal2d 459, 464:
"Ordinarily preliminary questions of fact that govern the
admissibility of evidence are determined by the trial court
when objection is made to the introduction of the evidence at
trial, and the. eJl;perience of tIle federal courts indicates that
there are no compelling reasons why an exception to the
general rule should be made in the case of illegally obtained
evidence. [Citations.] The issues involved will ordinarily be no
more time-consuming or complicated than those presented to
the trial court when it must rule, for example, on the admissibility of confessions, business records, or evidence claimed to
be privileged, or on the qualifications of expert or other witnesses. On the other hand, a requirement that a preliminary
motion be made to suppress the evidence would inevitably
result in delaying the criminal trial while the motion was
being noticed, calendared, heard, argued, and determined."
The orders are reversed.
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., and Burke, J., concurred.
MOSK, J.-I dissent.
The majority emphasize that sections 1539 and 1540 were
enacted in 1872, 83 years before the exclusionary rule was
adopted in People v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal2d 434 [282 P.2d
905, 50 A.L.R.2d 513). I fail to find that chronology particularly significant.
.
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Arata v. Superior Oourt (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 767 [315
P.2d 473], was decided two years after the Oah{ln decision,
and this court denied a hearing. In Arata it was pointed out
(at p. 770) that issuance of a search warrant is a judicial act
and that "[ t] he only review of such a judicial act that is
specifically provided by law, is the review sanctioned by sections 1539 and 1540 of the Penal Code." (Italics added.)
Section 1539 provides: "If the grounds on which the warrant
was issued be eontroverted, [the magistrate who issued tIle
search warrant] must proceed to take testimony. . . . "
Arata has been followed by an unbroken line of cases.
(People v. Thornton (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 718, 721 [327
P.2d 161] ; People v. Phillips (1958) 163 Cal.App.2d 541, 545
[329 P.2d 621] ; People v. Nelson (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d a56,
360 [340 P.2d 718] ; People v. Lepur (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d
798,802 [346 P.2d 914] ; People v. Dosier (1960) 180 Cal.App.
2d 436, 439 [4 CalRptr. 309]; People v. Prieto (1961) 191
Cal.App.2d 62, 66 [12 Cal.Rptr. 577]; People v. Marion
(1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 835,838 [18 Cal.Rptr. 219].)
I find no authority to justify overruling the foregoing postCahan decisions, and I am persuaded it is inadvisable to adopt
. a new rule. Under the majority view, a defendant who now has
five methods of achieving the exclusion of evidence, is gratuitously awarded a sixth and additional procedure whenever he
chooses to ignore or fails to first employ any of the other
available means. As pointed out in People v. Phillips, supra, at
page 545: "California cases indicate that, if prior to trial,
defendant had /iesired to challenge the validity of the search
warrant and the resulting effect of it she could have (a) made
a motion to quash it (People v. Berger, 44 Ca1.2d 459,461 [282
P.2d 509]); (b) petition for a writ of mandamus for the
return of the property (People v. Berger, supra) ; (c) made a
motion to suppress or exclude the evidence (People v. Alaniz,
[dissenting opinion] 149 Cal.App.2d 560, 571 [309 P.2d 71],
citing United States v. Kind, 87 F.2d 315,316) ; (d) sought a
writ of prohibition (Willson v. Superior Oourt, 46 Ca1.2d 291
[294 P.2d 36]). Also, defendant had certain rights under sections 1539 and 1540, Penal Code, ... "
Arata and its progeny hold unequivocally that failure to
pursue statutory remedies under sections 1539 and 1540 pre. eludes a defendant from controverting the facts slated in the
affidavit upon which the search warrant was based. This rule is
generally followed in other jurisdictions, with or \vithout
comparable statutes. (E.g., see Tischler v. State (1955) 206
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Md. 386 [111 A.2d 655, 657] ; One 1949 Model Oldsmobile v.
State (Okla. 1954) 276 P.2d 245,247; O'Brien v. State (1959)
205 Tenn. 405 [326 S.W.2d 759, 764] ; Hernandez v. State
(1952) 158 Tex. Crim. Rep. 296 [255 S.W.2d 219, 221] ; Goss
v. Maryland (19,51) 198 Md. 350 [84 A.2d 57, 58] ; Mattingly
v. Commonwealth (1949) 310 Ky. 561 [221 S.W.2d 82, 84] ;
People v. Alvis (1930) 342 Ill. 460 [174 N.E. 527] ; Seager v.
State (1928) 200 Ind. 579 [164 N.E. 274]; State v. Halbrook
(1925) 311 Mo. 664 [279 S.W. 395]; State v. Seymour (1924)
46 R.I. 257 [126 A. 755, 756]; State v. Englisk (1924) 71
Mont. 343 [229 P. 727].)
The majority suggest that sections 1539 and 1540 were designed "not to regulate the procedure for objecting to the
introduction of evidence in criminal trials but to afford the
person from whom property was wrongfulJy seized an expeditious remedy for its recovery." As recently as 1961 thia contention was rejected in People v Prieto, supra, 191 Cal.App.2d
62, at page 67, in which Mr. Justice Tobriner noted that although "as an original proposition, we might have doubted
whether the language of the sections literally applied to an
attempt of a defendant to suppress the evidence, rather than
to regain it, we think the cases have clearly disposed of the
issue. . . . A' belated change in the interpretation might well
produce more confusion than clarification." On May 31, 1961,
this court denied a hearing in Prieto.
Again in People v. Marion (1961) supra, 197 Cal.App.2d
835, 838, it was categorically asserted that the "rule is well
established that the issuance of a search warrant is a judicial
act and that the only review of such an act is that sanctioned
by sections 1539 and 1540 of the Penal Code. '.' Not only did
this court deny a hearing in Marion on February 7, 1962, but
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari (370 U.S.
961).
People v. Keener (1961) 55 Ca1.2d 714 [12 Cal.Rptr. 859,
361 P.2d 587], holds that a defendant may challenge the sufficiency of the warrant at trial if he takes the required protective steps before trial, the asserted reason being that an appeal
will not lie from denial of a motion to quash a warrant. While
one might quarrel with that rationale, since prohibition could
be sought in appellate courts in lieu of an appeal, stare decisis
compels adherence to Keener. The rule should be limited, however, to the conclusion announced (at p. 720) ; "Defendants,
prior to the preliminary hearing, did all that could reasonably
be expected of them to preserve their rights, and, under these
circumstances, the adverse ruling upon the motion to quash
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the warrant did not preclude them from subsequently raising
at the preliminary hearing their claim that the warrant was
defective. "
In the instant case the defendant took no steps to preserve
his rights. He made no motion to quash the warrant. He
sought no writ of mandate for return or destruction of the
property. He sought no writ of prohibition against use of the
property at the trial. He made no motion to suppress or exclude the evidence. In short, he ignored all of the possible
alternatives suggested in People v. Phillips, supra. Not until
the trial did he seek to determine the facts underlying the
issuance of the warrant.
The majority rely heavily, almost exclusively, on People v.
Berger (1955) 44 Cal.2d 459 [282 P.2d 509]. Factually, however, Berger is inapposite, for there the defendant prior to
trial moved before the municipal court judge who issued the
warrant, to quash the warrant. His motion was denied, so, still
before trial, he sought a writ of mandate in the superior court,
directing the municipal court to return the seized property.
This was granted, the original warrant was quashed, and the
records were returned. The problem discussed in the Berger
opinion arose when the prosecutor attempted to introduce into
evidence at the trial photostats of the records that had been
returned pursuant to the court order. Obviously that issue
could not have been reached prior to trial.
The majority see "no reason to adopt a different rule merely
because evidence was obtained under a warrant." But the
point is, as I see it, that there is and should be a marked
difference between evidence seized with and that taken without
a warrant. As Chief Justice Gibson wrote in Keener (1961)
supra, 55 Ca1.2d 714, 723: "There is, of course, nothing novel
in the view that law enforcement officials may be in a more
favorable position where a warrant is obtained than where
action is taken without a warrant."
If a defendant may attack the sufficiency of the warrant at
trial, without first following the procedures outlined in sections 1539 and 1540 and in the cases interpreting the sections,
much of the "favorable position where a warrant is obtained"
vanishes. My premonition is that hereafter there may be less
frequent use of warrants by law enforcement officers, an unwholesome result for the administration of criminal justice.
I would affirm the orders.
McComb, J., concurred.
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In re ARTHUR A. HERNANDEZ on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Right to Fair Trial: Judgment - Sentence - Where One Count Is Defective. - Though
defendant's prior conviction, which he denied, had not properly
been proved and his judgment of conviction was modified to
strike it, he was not denied due process of law and was not
entitled to relief from the judgment as modified where he had
waived a jury trial and was tried before a judge who could
presumably weigh the evidence without being prejudiced by
the charge of a prior conviction.
[2] Id.-Probation-Persons Eligible.-Although the fact that defendant's accomplice was anned with a deadly weapon at the
time of their robbery. made defendant guilty of first clegree
robbery (Pen. Code, § 211a) , he was eligible for probation
where he was not himself so armed (Pen. Code, § 1203).
[3] Habeas Corpus - Grounds for Relief - Probation. - Habeas
corpus is a proper remedy to secure reconsideration of an
application for probation on a corrected record where the trial
court may have been influenced in denying probation by ·an
erroneous finding of a prior felony conviction.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from
custody. Writ granted 'with directions.
Arthur A. Hernandez, in pro. per., and Burton Marks,
under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Robert R. Granucci
and John T. Murphy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner was convicted of first degree
robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 211a) in a nonjury trial on an
information charging him with a prior felony conviction in
Arizona. He denied the prior conviction, and evidence of it
was admitted at the trial. (Pen. Code, § 1025. 1 ) The trial
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 42; Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus
(1st ed § 66).
MeR:. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, §§ 104, 1017; [2]
Criminal Law, § 987; [3] Habeas Corpus, § 35.
I"When a defendant who is charged ill the accusatory pleading with
having suffered a previous conviction pleads either guilty or not guilty
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court found that petitioner was guilty of robbery, that the
offense was robbery in the first degree because an accomplice
was armed with a deadly weapon, and that petitioner had
suffered the prior felony conviction.' It denied probation and
sentenced petitioner to prison: On appeal the Attorney
General conceded that the prior conviction had not been
proved, because it could not bc determined from the Arizona
records that the offense would have been a felony if committed
in California. (See Pen. Code, § 1203.) The District Court of
Appeal affirmed the conviction but modified the judgment to
strike the prior conviction. (People v. Hernandez, nonpublished opinion, District Court of Appeal, 2 Crim. 9864, July 7,
1965.) We denied a petition for hearing.
In this habeas corpus proceeding petitioner contends that
he was denied due process of law by reason of the admission of evidence of his prior conviction and that the District
Court of Appeal should have reversed the judgment and
remanded the case for resentencing when it found ,that the
prior conviction had not been proved.
[1] There is no merit in petitioner's contention that he was
denied due process of law. Even if a jury might be u:t;lable
under some circumstances to disregard a defendant's prior
convictions in determining his guilt or innocence of the crime
charged (see Lane v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary (4th
Cir.) 320 F.2d 179; Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 [848.Ct.
1774,12 L.Ed.2d 908, 1 A.L.R.3d 1205]), the facts of this case
preclude the granting of relief. Petitioner waived a jury trial
and was tried before a judge, who was presumably able to
weigh the evidence without being prejudiced by a charge of a
prior felony conviction. (See People v. Purvis, 52 Ca1.2d 871,
883 [346 P.2d 22]; People v. Powell, 34 Ca1.2d 196, 204-205
[208 P.2d 974] ; People v. Smylie, 217 Cal.App.2d 118,122 [31
Cal.Rptr. 360].)
of the offense chlll"ged against him, he must be asked whether he has
Buffered Buch previous conviction. If he answers that he has, his answer
must be entered in the minutes of the court, and must, unless withdrawn
by consent of the court, be conclusive of the fact of his having suffered
Buch previous conviction in all subsequent proceedings. If he answers that
he has not, his answer must be entered in the minutes of the court, and
the question whether or not he has suffered such previous conviction must
be tried by the jury which tries the issue upon the plea of not guilty,
or in case of a plea of guilty, by a jury impaneled for that purpose, or
by the court if a jury is waived. The refusal of the defendant to answer
is equivalent to a denial that he has suffered such previous conviction.
In case the defendant pleads not guilty, and answers that he has suffered
the previous conviction, the charge of the previous conviction must not
be read ,to the jury, nor alluded to on the trial."

852

IN RE HERNANDEZ .

[64 C.2d

[2] Petitioner's second contention, however, is well taken.
The third paragraph of section 1203 of the Penal Code provides
that, "except in unusual cases where the interest of justice
demands a departure from the declared policy, no judge shall
grant probation to any person who shall have been convicted
of robbery, burglary or arson, and who at the time of the
perpetration of said crime or any of them or at the time of his
arrest was himself armed with a deadly weapon (unless at the
time he had a lawful right to carry the same), . . . nor to any
such person unless the court shall be satisfied that he has never
been previously convicted of a felony in this state nor previously convicted in any other place of a public offense which
would have been a felony if committed in this state." (Italics
added.) Although the fact that petitioner's accomplice was
armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the robbery made
petitioner guilty of first degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211a) ,
it did not affect 'his eligibility for probation since he was not
"himself" so armed. (People v. Perkins, 37 Ca1.2d 62, 64 [230
P.2d 353].) [3] The finding of the prior felony conviction, however, brought petitioner withi~ the limitation on the
granting of probation set forth in section 1203 and might have
influenced the trial court to deny his application for probation. If a trial court might have been influenced in denying probation by an erroneous finding of a prior felony
conviction, habeas corpus is a proper remedy to secure reconsideration of the application for probation upon a corrected
record. (In re Bartges, 44 Cal.2d 241, 247 [282 P.2d 47] ; see
People v. Morton, 41 Cal.2d 536, 545 [261 P.2d 523].)
,
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is granted, and the
District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Div.
Three, is directed to recall its remittitur in People v. Hernandez, 2 Crim. 9864, to vacate its decision, and to reverse the
judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County for
the sole purpose of permitting the trial judge to determine
whether probation should be granted upon the corrected
record.

McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J., and
Burke, J., concurred.

